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CECIL RHODES'S FUTURE.

BY PRINCESS CATHERINE RADZIWILL.

In the NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW for last March appeared an article headed "The Responsibility of Cecil Rhodes," and signed "A British Officer." This signature might have been avoided with advantage, unless it was used as a further proof of the incapacity of certain British officers, who, whilst absolutely ignorant of the various details of the South African question, seem to take a certain amount of pride in parading their want of knowledge, and opposing it to the experience of people who, having lived in the country all their lives, know its roads and its kopjes, as well as the character of its inhabitants and the intricacies of its politics.

Mr. Rhodes has just left England; he left it under a sort of a cloud, and it is the fashion just now to abuse him and his conduct during the war. It was the military authorities (previous to Lord Roberts's arrival in South Africa) who started this attack, in the hope of thus screening their own mistakes. But an attack, if it is to be successful, must be substantiated by some kind of facts, or else it misses its aim and becomes a libel.

Of such a nature is the article the responsibility of which is assumed by "a British Officer." In the first place, it accuses Mr. Rhodes of having deliberately and wilfully misled the British nation by his solemn assurance that there would be no war. But, even admitting that this were true, was Mr. Rhodes the only source of information which the British nation had? More than that, how could the assurances of a private individual affect the decision of the nation? It was not his place to do anything but express his ideas and conviction, and they were based on his confidence in the strength of the British army. There were other people who knew the great extent of the armaments of the Boers,

or, at least, who ought to have known it, and whose business it was to know it. Mr. Rhodes was neither the High Commissioner nor an Intelligence Officer; he was the head of one of the largest financial concerns in the world, and it was his duty not to create a panic amongst his shareholders. When he said he thought there would be no war, he was not speaking to the Government; in fact, he had no authority to speak to the Government, who, we have for it Mr. Chamberlain's own words, had kept systematically aloof from him since the Jameson raid and never consulted him in anything concerning South Africa. How can one, in face of such facts, say that it was the words of Mr. Rhodes which misled the nation! The nation, I repeat it again, had other sources of information, besides Mr. Rhodes's words, on which to base its judgments and opinions. It had responsible people in South Africa, whose duty it was to warn it of what was going on in the Transvaal. Why does the British Officer, who treats Mr. Rhodes as if he were the only authority in South Africa, not speak of the intelligence officers, who, under false names, and in very badly made clothes, bought in Cape Town, went up to the Transvaal in the firm conviction that the Boers would not know them under their disguises, and came back, after having seen just what the Boers chose to show them, imbued with the conviction that the war would be a simple walkover? Why does he forget that Sir Alfred Milner refused to listen to those who told him that the Transvaal Government was arming, and was not even aware of the amount of ammunition imported by them through the Cape Colony until his attention was called to it by the Progressive party, of which Mr. Rhodes is not the official but the real leader? Mr. Rhodes could not mislead the Government, because he had neither the authority nor the right to speak to the Government. If he had had such a right as is asserted by his accusers, there would not have been the necessity of having either a High Commissioner or an Intelligence Department in the Colony.

As for the argument that the Boers could not have declared war earlier, on account of the impossibility of their moving in their country during the winter months, it only shows that the writer has never been in that country, where fresh grass grows after each rainfall all through the winter, if not abundantly, at least in sufficient quantity to feed the hardened and long-suffering Boer ponies.

The second charge that the British Officer brings against Mr. Rhodes is that he interfered disastrously with the general conduct of the war. This is a very grave charge to bring against a man, and I wonder how it can be made in such a frivolous way. Mr. Rhodes went to Kimberley, not for reasons "at present unknown," but because not only his own but especially his shareholders' interests lay in Kimberley, because he was responsible to these shareholders, because it was only due to his energy and that of the other directors of De Beers that the town was able to defend itself. The correspondence between the Mayor of Kimberley and Mr. Schreiner, recently published, proves with what obstinacy the Cape Government refused to help the Diamond City, or even to recognize that it was in danger. It was De Beers who armed the town, who laid in provisions and ammunition. It was Mr. Rhodes who raised a mounted corps, who helped Colonel Harris, another director of De Beers, to organize his volunteers; it was Mr. Rhodes who opened soup kitchens, who helped with his purse the poor who could not find work, and with his words of encouragement those who were employed in the defense of the place. It was Mr. Rhodes who, later on, when the shells of the 100-pounder gun worked destruction in the town, opened his mines to the women and children who had not been able to get away before the beginning of the siege. Without Mr. Rhodes, Kimberley would have fallen, if only because it would not have been provided with sufficient ammunition or food. And it is this man who is accused of having disastrously interfered with the conduct of the war! But Mr. Rhodes has had nothing to do with the conduct of the war beyond defending his own property and that of his shareholders, or expressing his opinion as to Colonel Kekewich's peculiarities. Besides, it does not argue in favor of General Buller's independence or love for his country to affirm, as a British Officer does, that he abandoned the "only sound plan of campaign" at Mr. Rhodes's bidding. It gives to the latter an importance far greater than he admits himself to have, and to the former a want of firmness and judgment not only unworthy of, but even dangerous in, a Commander in Chief.

The fact is that the military authorities have one aim only, that of screening the mistakes of their subordinates. They bring monstrous charges against Mr. Rhodes in order to prevent the public from judging their own errors. It is to be hoped that the

public will not base its opinion on such one-sided articles as that which emanates from a "British Officer," but will look further ahead, and ask why Colonel Kekewich did not communicate to the population of Kimberley Cronje's offer to let the women and children go out of the town; why again, later on, he launched against Mr. Rhodes the accusation of having wished to surrender—an accusation which, when asked to do so, he could substantiate only by saying that, as Mr. Rhodes had called together a meeting of the civil defenders of the town, he (Colonel Kekewich) had concluded it was to propose to them to surrender to the Boers.

Mr. Rhodes has always had enemies. He would not be the great man he is if it were not so, and indeed some of them but add to his fame. However, one can be a man's enemy and yet prove just to him; it is justice which the friends of Mr. Rhodes claim for him, and in doing so they serve the interests of their country, because England has got nothing greater in South Africa than the "Colossus," as he is familiarly called; and, in defending him, she defends her own interests in the land of the Southern Cross.

It is all very well now for the Jingoës to scream over the prey they have not yet got, to vow vengeance and destruction against the Boers, and to hurl stones at Mr. Rhodes. It is all very well for earnest people who look at the war with all the sentimentality inherent in John Bull, and the narrow-mindedness of Non-conformist consciences, to preach magnanimity and indulgence. But those who have not been influenced by Jingoism, or who know that religion has got nothing to do with politics, are very well aware that, when matters come to a settlement, that settlement must be founded on strict imperial lines, without either sentimental magnanimity or harsh measures of retaliation such as some Colonials clamor for. Firmness and the pursuit of a line of policy tending to affirm England's supremacy over the whole of South Africa is the aim the Government ought to have in view and the principle from which it ought never to swerve, or else the present trouble will begin over again in ten years, and England cannot afford to incur such a risk. In this task of pacifying the country and at the same time imbuing the Dutch population with the conviction that England's supremacy must never be disputed again, the Government have not got a more powerful auxiliary than Mr. Rhodes, who was the first to start the imperial idea in

South Africa, who gave the Empire a kingdom, and in destroying whom one would destroy English prestige, which, whatever his enemies may say, is embodied in him. Governors come and go; the claims of the mother country, though recognized, are often not admitted; and, rightly or wrongly, since Majuba a strong feeling of distrust against the Government at home exists amongst a certain class of Colonials. Mr. Rhodes alone is always there. It is he who changed the gloomy wilderness of the past into a settled country, who opened it to the life of people and, it may be said, created South Africa. He worked these mines over the possession of two nations which are fighting now; he joined the country to the civilized world by means of railways and telegraphs; he felled forests, drained swamps, built factories, founded villages and settlements, brought in colonists, put down robbers, defended settlers against Matabele or Basuto raids, maintained the peace necessary for the welfare of the vast territory he had conquered, and introduced the rule of law and justice into it. It is through him that South Africa has lived, grown and flourished; and whatever some people in England may say or do, they will never wipe out the memory of these great deeds, they will never succeed in effacing that man's name from the annals of the land which he has brought before the notice of the world and given to his own country. It is very easy for a "British Officer" to say, or rather to insinuate, that he put the safety of Kimberley before everything else; but Kimberley, for Mr. Rhodes, represented the thousands, aye, the millions, of people who had believed in him and his genius; who had trusted him with their fortunes, and whom he felt called upon to protect and to defend, because he knew nobody else would do it. Whatever one may say of him, one cannot accuse Mr. Rhodes of not having realized what the fall of Kimberley or the collapse of De Beers would have meant to the whole of the civilized world; the ruin it would have involved, the hearts it would have broken, the lives it would have destroyed; and it is no wonder that he refused to assume this stupendous responsibility and preferred to run the risk of offending Colonel Kekewich.

I have spoken of the immense position Mr. Rhodes has made for himself in South Africa. I will now go further and say that, in spite of the animosity displayed by the Bond against him, he is still the favorite of a certain class of peaceful Dutch farmers,

who have kept a lurking sort of tenderness for him that they dare not show openly, but which they cherish in their hearts, just as they hide his photographs in a secret recess of their drawers. Farmers of this class, who are outwardly under the control but inwardly independent of the Bond, know very well that Mr. Rhodes is their best friend, and that he will always help them, because in helping them he will work for the good of the country. The one great mistake which is always made in South African affairs is the failure to differentiate between the Bond, who will never accept English rule or supremacy, and the reasonable part of the Dutch population, who only want to live peacefully, and who deplore the race hatred as much as we do. They see the situation as it really is, not with the eyes of the Jingo of their party. The latter insist that the present war has been brought about by English desire for the possession of the Transvaal gold fields. They are absolutely wrong in this pretense, as well as when they imagine that the securing of funds for needy British citizens, by acts of Parliament and secret service grants, with substantial personal bonuses, is the final ambition of Mr. Rhodes. Absurd as they are, those opinions are professed by the rank and file of the Bond party, though not shared by a considerable part of the Dutch population—a fact which alone would be sufficient to prove that the words Dutch and Bond are not synonymous.

To explain fully Mr. Rhodes's power in South Africa, it would be necessary to look back on the growth of the Imperial policy as applied to the Transvaal, but that would lead us too far. It is sufficient to say that he undoubtedly contributed to its expansion by developing Rhodesia, running a telegraph wire from the Cape to Cairo, negotiating a railway, and tracing a thin red line almost unbroken from North to South of Africa. It was then that he became the idol of Imperial England, which has proved itself now so ungrateful to him; and it was then that Mr. Chamberlain began to watch his flowing tide, whilst at the same time giving his attention to the Transvaal policy. The external relations of the Transvaal were controlled by England, which was responsible for its security from attack; but the disquieting symptom in the general situation was that Krüger required an extensive police force—extensive, inasmuch as his internal policy was irritating to people unaccustomed to oppression. The undercurrents of communication with Germany which have played such an impor-

tant part in Transvaal politics were taken as one with Germany's recent history and her colonial ambitions in Africa. Krüger's armaments were known to be immensely in excess of his internal requirements, and his burghers, who must not be confused with the Cape Dutch, openly talked of war with England at the favorable moment. The taxation was enormous, and the revenues were materially devoted to arming and intrigue. Any British Governor or Consul who, years ago, failed to read the writing on the wall must have been diplomatically insane. The chief difficulty of the Imperial Cabinet was to convince the nation of their danger, and one of the reasons why the Bond so bitterly hate Mr. Rhodes, and why England ought to support him, is that he saw that, under the profession of great loyalty, the aim of the Afrikaner policy was to disguise its real ambition. This policy was largely successful, played as it was for all it was worth through the medium of Mr. Labouchere, Dr. Clark, and even Mr. John Morley. A curious illustration of this fact is the following incident which was related to me by a member of the Cape Legislative Assembly. He was talking to a rich farmer, a member of the Bond, in one of the districts where most of the inhabitants have joined the Boers. The farmer was repeatedly affirming the loyalty of the Afrikaners in general and himself in particular to the English Crown, when suddenly as the conversation drifted on to the battle of Spytfontein, which had just been fought, he confidentially remarked: "There is just one point I am a little uneasy about; I am afraid the Boers have not enough cannons!"

Such men hate Mr. Rhodes, not because he betrayed them, as they say, when he raided Krüger, but because he is a great Englishman and a still greater Imperialist; and public opinion in England ought never in judging him to lose sight of this fact. But, curious to say, at the same time this Imperialism, which is well known and everywhere accepted in South Africa, gives Mr. Rhodes a certain popularity amongst the Dutch whose social policy and hatred of the English are incongruous. While professing their hatred of England, they hail with delight the marriage of one of their daughters to an Englishman, boast of the connection, and tell you with a feeling of pride, when they can do so, "This is my daughter; she is married to an Englishman"; and there seems to be something omitted when they say so, such as: "And there is therefore nothing for you to despise, inasmuch

as she is your national equal." It has always seemed to me (of course, I may be mistaken) that the principal reasons of the race hatred are: (1) the English look down on the Dutch, who in turn hate them for doing so; so much is this the case that, while it is among the Dutch themselves a half compliment to remind a man that he is an Englishman, it is a half insult to tell another that he is a Dutchman; (2) the English opinion of the native; this was the originating cause of the Transvaal and Free State Republics, and without it there would be no war to-day; (3) the religious gulf between the two races. The language question is probably another factor, but I do not think it is a material one. The position of nominal subordination to England accounts for a peculiar feature of this hatred, in that it is directed against the English as a nation and not as individuals. This explains why Mr. Rhodes is still popular amongst some Dutch, just as it explains why, although these Dutch are hostile to Great Britain, they would yet fight with her against a European nation that would try to assume a footing in South Africa. I am sure that, if only Mr. Rhodes were allowed a free hand, one of the chief results of the war would be the early disappearance of race hatred. It is not lightly that I make this statement, and I was certainly of the opposite opinion six months ago, but I have since convinced myself that I was wrong. The Dutchman of South Africa, and in this word I also include the Transvaal Boer, will always submit when he once fully recognizes the superior strength of his master. When convinced of it, the Boers will accept the inevitable, and, in making the best of it, probably discover all the advantages to be derived in time from the new conditions in which they find themselves placed. It is for this reason that I firmly believe that a really Imperial settlement, such as the one Mr. Rhodes came over to England to advocate and urge on the Government, would mean a consolidated and highly prosperous South Africa.

What would his rôle be in case this dream of his, a united South Africa under the British flag, came to be realized, which we must all hope will happen soon? It is difficult to foresee. The man is so great that if God granted to him that fulfilment of his hopes, possibilities would be opened to him which his own energy and tact alone would limit. The English would bow down to him, as to the man who first brought under their notice this new accession of power for their country, and the Afrikanders would

give way to the secret leaning they have always had toward him. His chief difficulties would be the existence of the Jingoës of both the South African League and the Bond, and one of his greatest problems would be to win back the moderate Dutch to true allegiance to the English Crown. It would not be so difficult as it at first seems. The Boers love an idol. Remove Mr. Hofmeyr's influence by proving to them that he had not their interests so much at heart as they imagined, destroy the glamour of the Transvaal, and what is left but Mr. Rhodes, the only real power in South Africa, the only man whose personal influence over his fellow creatures will withstand any kind of attack? Men like the Schreiners, Moltenos, Merrimans, and all the present Bond leaders, are but tinsel statesmen to the Afrikanders. They are of themselves. But Rhodes, the Imperialist, the man in whom thousands of people in England as well as over the whole world believe is the magician they will yet follow, and statesmen in England ought not to overlook this fact nor intrench themselves behind the Raid to condemn a man whose help they cannot afford to lose in the settlement of affairs in South Africa.

Apart from these considerations, Mr. Rhodes has got another important asset in his favor; that is, the present position in which the Bond is placed. It can only exist as a paramount factor in the Cape Parliament, and cannot afford to play a losing game. Once its power is broken its end is not far distant. Mr. Hofmeyr has built its organization on almost personal lines; he has no possible successor amongst the men of his party, and several of its rank and file have been only elected by very narrow majorities, which may easily dwindle into minorities if too many rebels are disfranchised, as undoubtedly will be the case after the war is over. For the present they have the upper hand, and they try to keep it in stirring up public opinion against Mr. Rhodes by saying that he is the creator of the present race hatred of the English which prevails amongst them; but that is only an excuse, as the feeling existed long before Mr. Rhodes was born. It founded the Transvaal sixty years ago, and it has caused the present trouble.

The reason of the Bond's animosity against Mr. Rhodes is that they thought they had converted him to their way of thinking, and they have never been able to forgive him for having left them in that belief, and omitted to take them into his confi-

dence at the time of the Jameson raid. But years go on, and in time when Mr. Hofmeyr will have been removed from the sphere of African politics, which must necessarily occur, the Bond itself, if it still exists, will look with more lenient eyes on the "Colossus" and not hold back to the bitter end, as it now says it will do.

The Dutch both in the Cape Colony and in the Transvaal, coming more and more in contact with the English, will naturally turn to Mr. Rhodes for at least material, if not political, support. He has so identified himself with South Africa that no one living in it will ever dream of turning in its needs toward any one else. Governors only represent a distant authority; besides, they are changed. Mr. Rhodes is always there, and, as all are aware, never fails to redress, if he can do so, the wrongs of those who come to him in their need.

As for the Bond, it is doomed to languish and disappear. It is more than probable that the Cape Progressives will win the next election by a small majority. Mr. Rhodes will then be obliged, whether he likes it or not, and whether the Government at home likes it or not, to assume the Premiership. And public opinion in England ought not to forget this, or to attack in such an unjustifiable way as the "British Officer" of the NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW does, a man who, very soon, perhaps, will become a responsible Minister of the Crown, and the representative of Imperialism in South Africa—the representative of an intelligent Imperialism, an Imperialism backed and supported by all the different parties in the country, an Imperialism which shall give itself the task of peacefully absorbing the Dutch into the English element, inducing the former to work in conjunction with the latter for the establishment of a new policy on purely Imperial lines. And one must not object that this would be impossible on account of the Jameson raid. The last word has not yet been spoken with regard to the raid, and perhaps time will show that Mr. Rhodes was in this sad business just as generous as he was imprudent, just as ready as he ever is, when he thinks it necessary for his country's welfare, to sacrifice his person in order to screen its prestige—even when that prestige is embodied in the person of Mr. Chamberlain, who is always as willing to disavow anything or anybody he believes to be compromising to himself, as he is forgetful of services rendered to him in the past.

When once the Progressive party has succeeded in command-

ing a majority, be it ever so small, in both Houses of the Cape Parliament, this majority is bound to increase steadily. It will include financial intelligence, the key to the outer world. The Bond will never be able to withstand this long, especially once they have lost their secret service funds, the absence of which will help more than anything else to bring to reason the Dutch farmer, who, after all, is not more disinterested than the rest of the world, and he will not grudge any longer his support to the power under whose rule he sees his way to prosperity. Once a group of these Dutch go over to the English side, and recognize the advantages of Imperialism, the spell of the Bond will be broken, the more easily because one of the greatest factors in Cape politics, which, strange to say, has been much overlooked, will have disappeared, too. I mean President Krüger, who up to now has dragooned the Bond (and this for years has meant the Government). Krüger hated the British, and persecuted Mr. Rhodes openly; he required his followers to do likewise, which they did without hesitating, and they have shown themselves as disloyal to Imperialism as it has been judicious for them to be. Their loyalty was in the interest of rebellion, and that was all Krüger expected of them, until the fateful day when he was ready and England was not. But once his influence is removed, nothing will be left for the Afrikaner but to accept the situation, and recognize Mr. Rhodes in his true light, that of the greatest Imperialist of his time, and they will naturally expect him to help them in their difficulties. He will be, and he is, the only man in South Africa capable of enforcing a reasonable settlement, in which the rights of every private individual will be respected, but at the same time where there will be no maudlin attempt to patch up peace and buy loyalty by Imperial concessions. One must have a clean slate, clean to the best interests of Imperialism. In a country like South Africa, with only a million whites, there is no need for five cantankerous states; there has been already too much of home rule and race hatred; the sections must be politically united.

People in England make the great mistake of judging the situation from a general point of view; they have but one great interest at heart, namely, the settlement of the question according to their ideas. They ignore Cape politics, and they will not admit that these politics are also a factor which must not be disregarded.

In the Cape Colony, and especially in Natal, they make precisely the same mistake, though, from the opposite point of view, and they will insist on the settlement being made according to their own local opinions. This unexpressed but very real conflict is bound to have an influence on the course of events, and an unfavorable one, too. It is to be hoped that the Government will show itself wiser than either its friends or its foes, and, whilst giving satisfaction to the just claims of loyal colonists, will try also not to overlook the political side of the question at the Cape, or the men who are bound up with it, and in whose hands the fate of the country will have to be left, more or less, in the future.

When I said "the men," I ought to have said "the man." Mr. Rhodes is the only one who can in assuming power really wield it, independently of political parties, or of ministers with whom he may be obliged to associate and work. The English public must not mistake on that point; the English Government must not think, as I believe it is led to do, that the prestige of Mr. Rhodes is as much shaken in South Africa as it is in London, where he was only made much of whilst people hoped to make money through him and did so. The inhabitants of South Africa know what they owe to the Colossus. They are well aware that his generosity has always helped those who applied to it, that his ambitions have never been for himself, that his work was always entered into for the good of his country or the benefits of civilization in general. They know that it is to his big mind alone that is due the great idea and principle of an Imperial Government gathering round it and under its rule the whole of South Africa, uniting its two white races, protecting its black and colored ones, and giving to this great Dark Continent the benefit of its justice and its laws, the shield of its flag and the respect of the world, which, while it envies and bitterly attacks England and its politics, yet bows before its power and might.

The time for writing in detail the history of the siege of Kimberley has not yet come. Besides, it would not do to touch upon certain incidents of it. But whoever has been there and gone through these weary months of anxiety, distress and privations of all kinds, whoever has been locked up in the Diamond City, far away from all he or she loved and cared for in this world, bears witness to Mr. Rhodes's admirable conduct during that interminable siege, to his kindness and thoughtfulness for others. His

presence there sustained the courage of all the inhabitants, who felt themselves safe whilst he was sharing their dangers, caring for their sick and wounded, always ready to do all he could for the welfare of his beloved Kimberley. He found work for the natives locked up in the compounds; he manufactured shells; his own resources, as well as those of De Beers, were devoted to the benefit of the besieged town, and in comparison with those services, what are the few small quarrels he may or may not have had with Colonel Kekewich?

I quite understand that the military authorities did not agree with Mr. Rhodes, whose vast mind could not grasp all the red tape which up to now has been paramount in all the war operations. They would not forgive the Colossus his independence, the iron will with which he swept away every obstacle which came in his path. But, at the same time, this dislike ought not to have taken the form of attacks such as that in the *NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW*. They do not argue well, either for their authors or for those who inspired them. I will say more—they overreach themselves, and, instead of harming Mr. Rhodes, simply destroy the prestige of those in whose hands the supreme command of the army lay, and whose paramount duty was to exercise that command, and not to allow a private individual to interfere with “the only sound plan of campaign,” if the abandonment of Kimberley to its fate meant such a thing.

The “British Officer” speaks of the responsibilities of Cecil Rhodes. He may be sure of one thing, and that is, that whatever these responsibilities are, there is not a single one the Colossus will refuse to assume, or will not accept with the same courage with which he submitted to all the consequences of the Jameson raid. He will be, and he ought to be, proud of having had the foresight to prepare Kimberley in time for the eventual possibility of a siege. He ought to be proud of having helped to defend this “greatest commercial asset in the world, Her Majesty’s flag,” as he said himself. And he ought especially to be proud of having won the affection, respect and gratitude of those amongst whom he came to take his place when danger threatened them, and whose anxieties and privations he shared. This affection, respect and gratitude will follow him wherever he goes, and help him to win further laurels in South Africa, in that country to which he belongs, if not by birth, at least by the work of his whole life.

A great future awaits him there, greater than the one Mr. Chamberlain has marked out for himself, and obstinately denied to his friend of by-gone days, perhaps his accomplice in far-fetched and far-seeking schemes. When this war is over, when commercial peace and prosperity are restored to South Africa, when the political life of the country begins again, the world will see that it will fall to Mr. Rhodes to direct the destinies of the new Empire over which Queen Victoria will preside. He will again, by the very force of circumstances, become the leading and paramount power in it; his genius will urge him on to it; the thousands of people who believe now, and will later on believe in him, will carry him to the zenith of political influence. All the small, petty souls who are so glad, at this present juncture, to attack and slander a greatness they cannot even realize—these envious, jealous people will have long been forgotten, whereas Cecil Rhodes's name will force itself to the notice of the entire civilized world, just as much as his railway will attract that of the world of commerce. His great idea, the development and expansion of the North, will make its way as quickly as the engine which will carry, through the wildernesses of Africa to the shores of the Mediterranean, the fame of the man whose ambitions for his country surpassed in immensity the new kingdom he had given her. People will then remember that this giant amongst men was also as kind-hearted as he was colossal, as full of courage as he was of faith in the mission he knew and felt the Almighty had given to him to fulfil. England will then hail him as one of her greatest heroes; South Africa will be proud of him as one of the greatest statesmen the world has produced; foreign nations will submit to his genius, sovereigns will recognize it, and when for the first time he shall travel over that railway which he called into existence, and look back on the past years so full of trouble and anxiety, so embittered by the suspicions, enmity and distrust of his many foes, so saddened by the defection and treachery of his so-called friends, he will then only perhaps realize his own greatness, and feel proud of having won at last the hard battle he had to fight against a prejudiced mob that ever was, and ever will be, an illustration of the untruth of the old Latin saying, "*Vox populi vox Dei*," because it only worships success, and, like most women, wants to see strength in the hands of those who govern it.

CATHERINE RADZIWILL.